1 /* 2 * Copyright (c) 1997, 2015, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. 3 * DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER. 4 * 5 * This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it 6 * under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as 7 * published by the Free Software Foundation. Oracle designates this 8 * particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided 9 * by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code. 10 * 11 * This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT 12 * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or 13 * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License 14 * version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that 15 * accompanied this code). 16 * 17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version 18 * 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, 19 * Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. 20 * 21 * Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA 22 * or visit www.oracle.com if you need additional information or have any 23 * questions. 24 */ 25 26 package java.lang; 27 28 import java.security.*; 29 import java.util.Enumeration; 30 import java.util.Hashtable; 31 import java.util.StringTokenizer; 32 33 /** 34 * This class is for runtime permissions. A RuntimePermission 35 * contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but 36 * no actions list; you either have the named permission 37 * or you don't. 38 * 39 * <P> 40 * The target name is the name of the runtime permission (see below). The 41 * naming convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention. 42 * Also, an asterisk 43 * may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to 44 * signify a wildcard match. For example: "loadLibrary.*" and "*" signify a 45 * wildcard match, while "*loadLibrary" and "a*b" do not. 46 * <P> 47 * The following table lists all the possible RuntimePermission target names, 48 * and for each provides a description of what the permission allows 49 * and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission. 50 * 51 * <table border=1 cellpadding=5 summary="permission target name, 52 * what the target allows,and associated risks"> 53 * <tr> 54 * <th>Permission Target Name</th> 55 * <th>What the Permission Allows</th> 56 * <th>Risks of Allowing this Permission</th> 57 * </tr> 58 * 59 * <tr> 60 * <td>createClassLoader</td> 61 * <td>Creation of a class loader</td> 62 * <td>This is an extremely dangerous permission to grant. 63 * Malicious applications that can instantiate their own class 64 * loaders could then load their own rogue classes into the system. 65 * These newly loaded classes could be placed into any protection 66 * domain by the class loader, thereby automatically granting the 67 * classes the permissions for that domain.</td> 68 * </tr> 69 * 70 * <tr> 71 * <td>getClassLoader</td> 72 * <td>Retrieval of a class loader (e.g., the class loader for the calling 73 * class)</td> 74 * <td>This would grant an attacker permission to get the 75 * class loader for a particular class. This is dangerous because 76 * having access to a class's class loader allows the attacker to 77 * load other classes available to that class loader. The attacker 78 * would typically otherwise not have access to those classes.</td> 79 * </tr> 80 * 81 * <tr> 82 * <td>setContextClassLoader</td> 83 * <td>Setting of the context class loader used by a thread</td> 84 * <td>The context class loader is used by system code and extensions 85 * when they need to lookup resources that might not exist in the system 86 * class loader. Granting setContextClassLoader permission would allow 87 * code to change which context class loader is used 88 * for a particular thread, including system threads.</td> 89 * </tr> 90 * 91 * <tr> 92 * <td>enableContextClassLoaderOverride</td> 93 * <td>Subclass implementation of the thread context class loader methods</td> 94 * <td>The context class loader is used by system code and extensions 95 * when they need to lookup resources that might not exist in the system 96 * class loader. Granting enableContextClassLoaderOverride permission would allow 97 * a subclass of Thread to override the methods that are used 98 * to get or set the context class loader for a particular thread.</td> 99 * </tr> 100 * 101 * <tr> 102 * <td>closeClassLoader</td> 103 * <td>Closing of a ClassLoader</td> 104 * <td>Granting this permission allows code to close any URLClassLoader 105 * that it has a reference to.</td> 106 * </tr> 107 * 108 * <tr> 109 * <td>setSecurityManager</td> 110 * <td>Setting of the security manager (possibly replacing an existing one) 111 * </td> 112 * <td>The security manager is a class that allows 113 * applications to implement a security policy. Granting the setSecurityManager 114 * permission would allow code to change which security manager is used by 115 * installing a different, possibly less restrictive security manager, 116 * thereby bypassing checks that would have been enforced by the original 117 * security manager.</td> 118 * </tr> 119 * 120 * <tr> 121 * <td>createSecurityManager</td> 122 * <td>Creation of a new security manager</td> 123 * <td>This gives code access to protected, sensitive methods that may 124 * disclose information about other classes or the execution stack.</td> 125 * </tr> 126 * 127 * <tr> 128 * <td>getenv.{variable name}</td> 129 * <td>Reading of the value of the specified environment variable</td> 130 * <td>This would allow code to read the value, or determine the 131 * existence, of a particular environment variable. This is 132 * dangerous if the variable contains confidential data.</td> 133 * </tr> 134 * 135 * <tr> 136 * <td>exitVM.{exit status}</td> 137 * <td>Halting of the Java Virtual Machine with the specified exit status</td> 138 * <td>This allows an attacker to mount a denial-of-service attack 139 * by automatically forcing the virtual machine to halt. 140 * Note: The "exitVM.*" permission is automatically granted to all code 141 * loaded from the application class path, thus enabling applications 142 * to terminate themselves. Also, the "exitVM" permission is equivalent to 143 * "exitVM.*".</td> 144 * </tr> 145 * 146 * <tr> 147 * <td>shutdownHooks</td> 148 * <td>Registration and cancellation of virtual-machine shutdown hooks</td> 149 * <td>This allows an attacker to register a malicious shutdown 150 * hook that interferes with the clean shutdown of the virtual machine.</td> 151 * </tr> 152 * 153 * <tr> 154 * <td>setFactory</td> 155 * <td>Setting of the socket factory used by ServerSocket or Socket, 156 * or of the stream handler factory used by URL</td> 157 * <td>This allows code to set the actual implementation 158 * for the socket, server socket, stream handler, or RMI socket factory. 159 * An attacker may set a faulty implementation which mangles the data 160 * stream.</td> 161 * </tr> 162 * 163 * <tr> 164 * <td>setIO</td> 165 * <td>Setting of System.out, System.in, and System.err</td> 166 * <td>This allows changing the value of the standard system streams. 167 * An attacker may change System.in to monitor and 168 * steal user input, or may set System.err to a "null" OutputStream, 169 * which would hide any error messages sent to System.err. </td> 170 * </tr> 171 * 172 * <tr> 173 * <td>modifyThread</td> 174 * <td>Modification of threads, e.g., via calls to Thread 175 * <tt>interrupt</tt>, <tt>stop</tt>, <tt>suspend</tt>, 176 * <tt>resume</tt>, <tt>setDaemon</tt>, <tt>setPriority</tt>, 177 * <tt>setName</tt> and <tt>setUncaughtExceptionHandler</tt> 178 * methods</td> 179 * <td>This allows an attacker to modify the behaviour of 180 * any thread in the system.</td> 181 * </tr> 182 * 183 * <tr> 184 * <td>stopThread</td> 185 * <td>Stopping of threads via calls to the Thread <code>stop</code> 186 * method</td> 187 * <td>This allows code to stop any thread in the system provided that it is 188 * already granted permission to access that thread. 189 * This poses as a threat, because that code may corrupt the system by 190 * killing existing threads.</td> 191 * </tr> 192 * 193 * <tr> 194 * <td>modifyThreadGroup</td> 195 * <td>modification of thread groups, e.g., via calls to ThreadGroup 196 * <code>destroy</code>, <code>getParent</code>, <code>resume</code>, 197 * <code>setDaemon</code>, <code>setMaxPriority</code>, <code>stop</code>, 198 * and <code>suspend</code> methods</td> 199 * <td>This allows an attacker to create thread groups and 200 * set their run priority.</td> 201 * </tr> 202 * 203 * <tr> 204 * <td>getProtectionDomain</td> 205 * <td>Retrieval of the ProtectionDomain for a class</td> 206 * <td>This allows code to obtain policy information 207 * for a particular code source. While obtaining policy information 208 * does not compromise the security of the system, it does give 209 * attackers additional information, such as local file names for 210 * example, to better aim an attack.</td> 211 * </tr> 212 * 213 * <tr> 214 * <td>getFileSystemAttributes</td> 215 * <td>Retrieval of file system attributes</td> 216 * <td>This allows code to obtain file system information such as disk usage 217 * or disk space available to the caller. This is potentially dangerous 218 * because it discloses information about the system hardware 219 * configuration and some information about the caller's privilege to 220 * write files.</td> 221 * </tr> 222 * 223 * <tr> 224 * <td>readFileDescriptor</td> 225 * <td>Reading of file descriptors</td> 226 * <td>This would allow code to read the particular file associated 227 * with the file descriptor read. This is dangerous if the file 228 * contains confidential data.</td> 229 * </tr> 230 * 231 * <tr> 232 * <td>writeFileDescriptor</td> 233 * <td>Writing to file descriptors</td> 234 * <td>This allows code to write to a particular file associated 235 * with the descriptor. This is dangerous because it may allow 236 * malicious code to plant viruses or at the very least, fill up 237 * your entire disk.</td> 238 * </tr> 239 * 240 * <tr> 241 * <td>loadLibrary.{library name}</td> 242 * <td>Dynamic linking of the specified library</td> 243 * <td>It is dangerous to allow an applet permission to load native code 244 * libraries, because the Java security architecture is not designed to and 245 * does not prevent malicious behavior at the level of native code.</td> 246 * </tr> 247 * 248 * <tr> 249 * <td>accessClassInPackage.{package name}</td> 250 * <td>Access to the specified package via a class loader's 251 * <code>loadClass</code> method when that class loader calls 252 * the SecurityManager <code>checkPackageAccess</code> method</td> 253 * <td>This gives code access to classes in packages 254 * to which it normally does not have access. Malicious code 255 * may use these classes to help in its attempt to compromise 256 * security in the system.</td> 257 * </tr> 258 * 259 * <tr> 260 * <td>defineClassInPackage.{package name}</td> 261 * <td>Definition of classes in the specified package, via a class 262 * loader's <code>defineClass</code> method when that class loader calls 263 * the SecurityManager <code>checkPackageDefinition</code> method.</td> 264 * <td>This grants code permission to define a class 265 * in a particular package. This is dangerous because malicious 266 * code with this permission may define rogue classes in 267 * trusted packages like <code>java.security</code> or <code>java.lang</code>, 268 * for example.</td> 269 * </tr> 270 * 271 * <tr> 272 * <td>accessDeclaredMembers</td> 273 * <td>Access to the declared members of a class</td> 274 * <td>This grants code permission to query a class for its public, 275 * protected, default (package) access, and private fields and/or 276 * methods. Although the code would have 277 * access to the private and protected field and method names, it would not 278 * have access to the private/protected field data and would not be able 279 * to invoke any private methods. Nevertheless, malicious code 280 * may use this information to better aim an attack. 281 * Additionally, it may invoke any public methods and/or access public fields 282 * in the class. This could be dangerous if 283 * the code would normally not be able to invoke those methods and/or 284 * access the fields because 285 * it can't cast the object to the class/interface with those methods 286 * and fields. 287 </td> 288 * </tr> 289 * <tr> 290 * <td>queuePrintJob</td> 291 * <td>Initiation of a print job request</td> 292 * <td>This could print sensitive information to a printer, 293 * or simply waste paper.</td> 294 * </tr> 295 * 296 * <tr> 297 * <td>getStackTrace</td> 298 * <td>Retrieval of the stack trace information of another thread.</td> 299 * <td>This allows retrieval of the stack trace information of 300 * another thread. This might allow malicious code to monitor the 301 * execution of threads and discover vulnerabilities in applications.</td> 302 * </tr> 303 * 304 * <tr> 305 * <td>setDefaultUncaughtExceptionHandler</td> 306 * <td>Setting the default handler to be used when a thread 307 * terminates abruptly due to an uncaught exception</td> 308 * <td>This allows an attacker to register a malicious 309 * uncaught exception handler that could interfere with termination 310 * of a thread</td> 311 * </tr> 312 * 313 * <tr> 314 * <td>preferences</td> 315 * <td>Represents the permission required to get access to the 316 * java.util.prefs.Preferences implementations user or system root 317 * which in turn allows retrieval or update operations within the 318 * Preferences persistent backing store.) </td> 319 * <td>This permission allows the user to read from or write to the 320 * preferences backing store if the user running the code has 321 * sufficient OS privileges to read/write to that backing store. 322 * The actual backing store may reside within a traditional filesystem 323 * directory or within a registry depending on the platform OS</td> 324 * </tr> 325 * 326 * <tr> 327 * <td>usePolicy</td> 328 * <td>Granting this permission disables the Java Plug-In's default 329 * security prompting behavior.</td> 330 * <td>For more information, refer to Java Plug-In's guides, <a href= 331 * "../../../technotes/guides/plugin/developer_guide/security.html"> 332 * Applet Security Basics</a> and <a href= 333 * "../../../technotes/guides/plugin/developer_guide/rsa_how.html#use"> 334 * usePolicy Permission</a>.</td> 335 * </tr> 336 * <tr> 337 * <td>manageProcess</td> 338 * <td>Native process termination and information about processes 339 * {@link ProcessHandle}.</td> 340 * <td>Allows code to identify and terminate processes that it did not create.</td> 341 * </tr> 342 * 343 * <tr> 344 * <td>localeServiceProvider</td> 345 * <td>This {@code RuntimePermission} is required to be granted to 346 * classes which subclass and implement 347 * {@code java.util.spi.LocaleServiceProvider}. The permission is 348 * checked during invocation of the abstract base class constructor. 349 * This permission ensures trust in classes which implement this 350 * security-sensitive provider mechanism. </td> 351 * <td>See <a href= "../util/spi/LocaleServiceProvider.html"> 352 * {@code java.util.spi.LocaleServiceProvider}</a> for more 353 * information.</td> 354 * </tr> 355 * </table> 356 * 357 * @see java.security.BasicPermission 358 * @see java.security.Permission 359 * @see java.security.Permissions 360 * @see java.security.PermissionCollection 361 * @see java.lang.SecurityManager 362 * 363 * 364 * @author Marianne Mueller 365 * @author Roland Schemers 366 */ 367 368 public final class RuntimePermission extends BasicPermission { 369 370 private static final long serialVersionUID = 7399184964622342223L; 371 372 /** 373 * Creates a new RuntimePermission with the specified name. 374 * The name is the symbolic name of the RuntimePermission, such as 375 * "exit", "setFactory", etc. An asterisk 376 * may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to 377 * signify a wildcard match. 378 * 379 * @param name the name of the RuntimePermission. 380 * 381 * @throws NullPointerException if <code>name</code> is <code>null</code>. 382 * @throws IllegalArgumentException if <code>name</code> is empty. 383 */ 384 385 public RuntimePermission(String name) 386 { 387 super(name); 388 } 389 390 /** 391 * Creates a new RuntimePermission object with the specified name. 392 * The name is the symbolic name of the RuntimePermission, and the 393 * actions String is currently unused and should be null. 394 * 395 * @param name the name of the RuntimePermission. 396 * @param actions should be null. 397 * 398 * @throws NullPointerException if <code>name</code> is <code>null</code>. 399 * @throws IllegalArgumentException if <code>name</code> is empty. 400 */ 401 402 public RuntimePermission(String name, String actions) 403 { 404 super(name, actions); 405 } 406 }