27
28 import java.security.*;
29 import java.util.Enumeration;
30 import java.util.Hashtable;
31 import java.util.StringTokenizer;
32
33 /**
34 * This class is for Serializable permissions. A SerializablePermission
35 * contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but
36 * no actions list; you either have the named permission
37 * or you don't.
38 *
39 * <P>
40 * The target name is the name of the Serializable permission (see below).
41 *
42 * <P>
43 * The following table lists the standard {@code SerializablePermission} target names,
44 * and for each provides a description of what the permission allows
45 * and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.
46 *
47 * <table border=1 cellpadding=5 summary="Permission target name, what the permission allows, and associated risks">
48 * <tr>
49 * <th>Permission Target Name</th>
50 * <th>What the Permission Allows</th>
51 * <th>Risks of Allowing this Permission</th>
52 * </tr>
53 *
54 * <tr>
55 * <td>enableSubclassImplementation</td>
56 * <td>Subclass implementation of ObjectOutputStream or ObjectInputStream
57 * to override the default serialization or deserialization, respectively,
58 * of objects</td>
59 * <td>Code can use this to serialize or
60 * deserialize classes in a purposefully malfeasant manner. For example,
61 * during serialization, malicious code can use this to
62 * purposefully store confidential private field data in a way easily accessible
63 * to attackers. Or, during deserialization it could, for example, deserialize
64 * a class with all its private fields zeroed out.</td>
65 * </tr>
66 *
67 * <tr>
68 * <td>enableSubstitution</td>
69 * <td>Substitution of one object for another during
70 * serialization or deserialization</td>
71 * <td>This is dangerous because malicious code
72 * can replace the actual object with one which has incorrect or
73 * malignant data.</td>
74 * </tr>
75 *
76 * <tr>
77 * <td>serialFilter</td>
78 * <td>Setting a filter for ObjectInputStreams.</td>
79 * <td>Code could remove a configured filter and remove protections
80 * already established.</td>
81 * </tr>
82 *
83 * </table>
84 *
85 * @see java.security.BasicPermission
86 * @see java.security.Permission
87 * @see java.security.Permissions
88 * @see java.security.PermissionCollection
89 * @see java.lang.SecurityManager
90 *
91 *
92 * @author Joe Fialli
93 * @since 1.2
94 */
95
96 /* code was borrowed originally from java.lang.RuntimePermission. */
97
98 public final class SerializablePermission extends BasicPermission {
99
100 private static final long serialVersionUID = 8537212141160296410L;
101
102 /**
|
27
28 import java.security.*;
29 import java.util.Enumeration;
30 import java.util.Hashtable;
31 import java.util.StringTokenizer;
32
33 /**
34 * This class is for Serializable permissions. A SerializablePermission
35 * contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but
36 * no actions list; you either have the named permission
37 * or you don't.
38 *
39 * <P>
40 * The target name is the name of the Serializable permission (see below).
41 *
42 * <P>
43 * The following table lists the standard {@code SerializablePermission} target names,
44 * and for each provides a description of what the permission allows
45 * and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.
46 *
47 * <table class="striped">
48 * <caption style="display:none">Permission target name, what the permission allows, and associated risks</caption>
49 * <thead>
50 * <tr>
51 * <th>Permission Target Name</th>
52 * <th>What the Permission Allows</th>
53 * <th>Risks of Allowing this Permission</th>
54 * </tr>
55 * </thead>
56 * <tbody>
57 *
58 * <tr>
59 * <td>enableSubclassImplementation</td>
60 * <td>Subclass implementation of ObjectOutputStream or ObjectInputStream
61 * to override the default serialization or deserialization, respectively,
62 * of objects</td>
63 * <td>Code can use this to serialize or
64 * deserialize classes in a purposefully malfeasant manner. For example,
65 * during serialization, malicious code can use this to
66 * purposefully store confidential private field data in a way easily accessible
67 * to attackers. Or, during deserialization it could, for example, deserialize
68 * a class with all its private fields zeroed out.</td>
69 * </tr>
70 *
71 * <tr>
72 * <td>enableSubstitution</td>
73 * <td>Substitution of one object for another during
74 * serialization or deserialization</td>
75 * <td>This is dangerous because malicious code
76 * can replace the actual object with one which has incorrect or
77 * malignant data.</td>
78 * </tr>
79 *
80 * <tr>
81 * <td>serialFilter</td>
82 * <td>Setting a filter for ObjectInputStreams.</td>
83 * <td>Code could remove a configured filter and remove protections
84 * already established.</td>
85 * </tr>
86 * </tbody>
87 * </table>
88 *
89 * @see java.security.BasicPermission
90 * @see java.security.Permission
91 * @see java.security.Permissions
92 * @see java.security.PermissionCollection
93 * @see java.lang.SecurityManager
94 *
95 *
96 * @author Joe Fialli
97 * @since 1.2
98 */
99
100 /* code was borrowed originally from java.lang.RuntimePermission. */
101
102 public final class SerializablePermission extends BasicPermission {
103
104 private static final long serialVersionUID = 8537212141160296410L;
105
106 /**
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