The Status of JSR 292 & InvokeDynamic

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JSR 292 Update: Agenda

- Security
- API
- Implementation
- Performance
Security
Caller sensitivity

- A few dozen JDK methods are **caller sensitive**
  - This means their caller’s identity is an implicit argument
  - This implicit argument cannot be forged or spoofed
- Many methods use this identity to make security-sensitive decisions

```java
class MyUntrustedApplet {
    public static void main(String... args) throws Throwable {
        System.setSecurityManager(new SecurityManager());
        Class.forName("sun.misc.Unsafe"); // caller ID = MyUntrustedApplet
    }
}
```
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import java.lang.invoke.*;
class MyUntrustedApplet {
    public static void main(String... args) throws Throwable {
        System.setSecurityManager(new SecurityManager());
        Class.forName("sun.misc.Unsafe"); // caller ID = MyUntrustedApplet
        MethodHandle MH_forName = MethodHandles.lookup()
            .findStatic(Class.class, "forName",
                        MethodType.methodType(Class.class, String.class));
        MH_forName.invokeWithArguments("sun.misc.Unsafe"); // caller ID = ??
    }
}
```
Caller sensitivity update

- Explicitly mark these methods with @CallerSensitive
- Process them with special care when making method handles
- Enforce existing design rule:

  \[ MH \text{ invocation} \equiv \text{bytecode behavior} \]

- Result: Every “lookup” sees a distinct version of Class.forName, etc.
Unstructured caller sensitivity: removed

- sun.reflect.Reflection.getCallerClass(4)
- Four? Really?
- Change #1: Parameter must be 1.
- Change #2: Methods to be marked and processed with care.

    // NOTE: be very careful if you change the stack depth of this
    // routine. The depth of the "getCallerClass" call is hardwired so
    // that the compiler can have an easier time if this gets inlined.
    private void doSecurityCheck(Object obj) throws IllegalAccessException {
        if (!override) {
            if (!Reflection.quickCheckMemberAccess(clazz, modifiers)) {
                Class caller = Reflection.getCallerClass(4);
Unstructured caller sensitivity: *restored*

- Security updates in JDK 7 sanitized and limited this method
- Broke certain customers: dynamic languages, loggers
- Hook restored in JDK 7, but is removed from JDK 8
- WIP to create a safer-saner replacement not based on magic ints
More precise capability checks: Private access

- MethodHandles.publicLookup vs. MethodHandles.lookup
  - One is “minimally trusted”, one is “full power”
  - The latter has **private access**
- For a given lookup class \( C \), a **private access** lookup can:
  - access private fields, methods, and constructors of \( C \)
  - create method handles which invoke caller sensitive methods
  - create method handles which emulate invokespecial instructions
  - avoid package access checks for classes accessible to \( C \)
  - create delegated lookup objects for nestmates of \( C \)
More precise capability checks: The flipside

- Less-trusted lookup objects have reduced capabilities
- The least trusted lookup, MHs.publicLookup():
  - can access only public fields, methods, and constructors
  - cannot create method handles to caller sensitive methods
  - cannot create method handles which emulate invokespecial
  - must incur package access checks for target method package
  - cannot create delegated lookup objects of greater power
Aligned security manager checks

- Calls to SecurityManager.checkPackageAccess aligned with bytecode
- A MH could be expressed as as constant pool constant...
- if and only if it can be expressed as a native bytecode behavior...
- if and only if the MH can be reflected using the Lookup API
- Practical outcome: SM checks are irrelevant to private access lookup
API
New API: MethodHandleInfo

- A way to “crack” any CONSTANT_MethodHandle constant
- Also works on Lookup-derived MHs that “could have been” constants
- Capability based: You can only “crack” your own MHs
New API: MethodHandles.collectArguments

- A missing form of function composition
- Allows any sequence of N arguments to be filtered down to one
- Existing APIs allow filtering of *all* arguments, or *one*, but not *some*. 
Clarifications

- Concept of “bytecode behavior” emphasized and expanded
- Concept of “private access” emphasized and expanded
Nits and gnats...

- Initialization order aligned with bytecode behavior (getstatic, etc.)
- Access checking aligned with bytecode behavior
- Certain exceptions clarified and defined
  - High arity corner cases
  - Wrong-arity calls to a spreader
Implementation
Implementation refresh: motivations

- security issues (see above)
- NoClassDefFound bug
- maintainability of assembly code
- method handle creation requires a visit to JNI code (for each MH)
implementation refresh: 2012/07/24
7023639: JSR 292 ... needs a fast path

- move calling logic to Java code (IR = "Lambda Forms")
- generate adapter bytecodes on the fly, using ASM, loaded as "anonymous classes"
- some adapters statically defined (maybe more later)
- erase reference types in adapters
- written in JDK 8, back ported to JDK 7u40
- composition uses low-level bytecodes and Java method calls
implementation refresh: upsides

- no assembly code (well, less than 100 lines)
- C++ LOC -13028 +5414; Java LOC -3510 +6973
- debugger can show internal method handle slots and call frames
- better framework for optimization...

(kill -SIGSECURITY $$)
implementation refresh: downsides

- interpretation needs a tune-down (LambdaForm.interpretWithArguments)
- "epic stack traces" (awkward use of nested IR constructs)
- storage leaks at scale (IR generation does not converge)
- JIT needs tuning for new code shapes
implementation refresh: downsides

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Performance
Current performance work

- improve classic JIT optimizations: inlining, escape analysis
  - retune inlining heuristics after implementation refresh
- iterating on JDK 8 Closures
  - bootstrap method performance, constant call sites
- iterating on Nashorn JavaScript implementation
Current performance work: some details

- fast path for MH.asType and generic MH.invoke
- more caching of direct method handle constants
- carefully targeted eager rendering to bytecodes (e.g., after BSM)
  - reduces visits to the LF interpreter
- better processing of repeated lambda forms
  - detect repeats and reuse generated bytecodes
  - avoid repeats by caching
- flattening of “epic backtraces”
- current compiler team push is through this CY