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src/java.desktop/share/classes/java/awt/AWTPermission.java
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@@ -47,161 +47,131 @@
* <table class="striped">
* <caption>AWTPermission target names, descriptions, and associated risks
* </caption>
* <thead>
* <tr>
- * <th>Permission Target Name</th>
- * <th>What the Permission Allows</th>
- * <th>Risks of Allowing this Permission</th>
- * </tr>
+ * <th scope="col">Permission Target Name
+ * <th scope="col">What the Permission Allows
+ * <th scope="col">Risks of Allowing this Permission
* </thead>
* <tbody>
* <tr>
- * <td>accessClipboard</td>
- * <td>Posting and retrieval of information to and from the AWT clipboard</td>
- * <td>This would allow malfeasant code to share
- * potentially sensitive or confidential information.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>accessEventQueue</td>
- * <td>Access to the AWT event queue</td>
- * <td>After retrieving the AWT event queue,
- * malicious code may peek at and even remove existing events
- * from its event queue, as well as post bogus events which may purposefully
- * cause the application or applet to misbehave in an insecure manner.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
+ * <th scope="row">accessClipboard
+ * <td>Posting and retrieval of information to and from the AWT clipboard
+ * <td>This would allow malfeasant code to share potentially sensitive or
+ * confidential information.
+ * <tr>
+ * <th scope="row">accessEventQueue
+ * <td>Access to the AWT event queue
+ * <td>After retrieving the AWT event queue, malicious code may peek at and
+ * even remove existing events from its event queue, as well as post bogus
+ * events which may purposefully cause the application or applet to
+ * misbehave in an insecure manner.
* <tr>
- * <td>accessSystemTray</td>
- * <td>Access to the AWT SystemTray instance</td>
+ * <th scope="row">accessSystemTray
+ * <td>Access to the AWT SystemTray instance
* <td>This would allow malicious code to add tray icons to the system tray.
* First, such an icon may look like the icon of some known application
- * (such as a firewall or anti-virus) and order a user to do something unsafe
- * (with help of balloon messages). Second, the system tray may be glutted with
- * tray icons so that no one could add a tray icon anymore.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>createRobot</td>
- * <td>Create java.awt.Robot objects</td>
- * <td>The java.awt.Robot object allows code to generate native-level
- * mouse and keyboard events as well as read the screen. It could allow
- * malicious code to control the system, run other programs, read the
- * display, and deny mouse and keyboard access to the user.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>fullScreenExclusive</td>
- * <td>Enter full-screen exclusive mode</td>
- * <td>Entering full-screen exclusive mode allows direct access to
- * low-level graphics card memory. This could be used to spoof the
- * system, since the program is in direct control of rendering. Depending on
- * the implementation, the security warning may not be shown for the windows
- * used to enter the full-screen exclusive mode (assuming that the {@code
- * fullScreenExclusive} permission has been granted to this application). Note
- * that this behavior does not mean that the {@code
- * showWindowWithoutWarningBanner} permission will be automatically granted to
- * the application which has the {@code fullScreenExclusive} permission:
- * non-full-screen windows will continue to be shown with the security
- * warning.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>listenToAllAWTEvents</td>
- * <td>Listen to all AWT events, system-wide</td>
- * <td>After adding an AWT event listener,
- * malicious code may scan all AWT events dispatched in the system,
- * allowing it to read all user input (such as passwords). Each
- * AWT event listener is called from within the context of that
- * event queue's EventDispatchThread, so if the accessEventQueue
- * permission is also enabled, malicious code could modify the
- * contents of AWT event queues system-wide, causing the application
- * or applet to misbehave in an insecure manner.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
+ * (such as a firewall or anti-virus) and order a user to do something
+ * unsafe (with help of balloon messages). Second, the system tray may be
+ * glutted with tray icons so that no one could add a tray icon anymore.
+ * <tr>
+ * <th scope="row">createRobot
+ * <td>Create java.awt.Robot objects
+ * <td>The java.awt.Robot object allows code to generate native-level mouse
+ * and keyboard events as well as read the screen. It could allow malicious
+ * code to control the system, run other programs, read the display, and
+ * deny mouse and keyboard access to the user.
+ * <tr>
+ * <th scope="row">fullScreenExclusive
+ * <td>Enter full-screen exclusive mode
+ * <td>Entering full-screen exclusive mode allows direct access to low-level
+ * graphics card memory. This could be used to spoof the system, since the
+ * program is in direct control of rendering. Depending on the
+ * implementation, the security warning may not be shown for the windows
+ * used to enter the full-screen exclusive mode (assuming that the
+ * {@code fullScreenExclusive} permission has been granted to this
+ * application). Note that this behavior does not mean that the
+ * {@code showWindowWithoutWarningBanner} permission will be automatically
+ * granted to the application which has the {@code fullScreenExclusive}
+ * permission: non-full-screen windows will continue to be shown with the
+ * security warning.
+ * <tr>
+ * <th scope="row">listenToAllAWTEvents
+ * <td>Listen to all AWT events, system-wide
+ * <td>After adding an AWT event listener, malicious code may scan all AWT
+ * events dispatched in the system, allowing it to read all user input (such
+ * as passwords). Each AWT event listener is called from within the context
+ * of that event queue's EventDispatchThread, so if the accessEventQueue
+ * permission is also enabled, malicious code could modify the contents of
+ * AWT event queues system-wide, causing the application or applet to
+ * misbehave in an insecure manner.
* <tr>
- * <td>readDisplayPixels</td>
- * <td>Readback of pixels from the display screen</td>
+ * <th scope="row">readDisplayPixels
+ * <td>Readback of pixels from the display screen
* <td>Interfaces such as the java.awt.Composite interface or the
* java.awt.Robot class allow arbitrary code to examine pixels on the
- * display enable malicious code to snoop on the activities of the user.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
+ * display enable malicious code to snoop on the activities of the user.
* <tr>
- * <td>replaceKeyboardFocusManager</td>
- * <td>Sets the {@code KeyboardFocusManager} for
- * a particular thread.
- * <td>When {@code SecurityManager} is installed, the invoking
- * thread must be granted this permission in order to replace
- * the current {@code KeyboardFocusManager}. If permission
- * is not granted, a {@code SecurityException} will be thrown.
- * </tr>
- *
+ * <th scope="row">replaceKeyboardFocusManager
+ * <td>Sets the {@code KeyboardFocusManager} for a particular thread.
+ * <td>When {@code SecurityManager} is installed, the invoking thread must
+ * be granted this permission in order to replace the current
+ * {@code KeyboardFocusManager}. If permission is not granted, a
+ * {@code SecurityException} will be thrown.
* <tr>
- * <td>setAppletStub</td>
- * <td>Setting the stub which implements Applet container services</td>
+ * <th scope="row">setAppletStub
+ * <td>Setting the stub which implements Applet container services
* <td>Malicious code could set an applet's stub and result in unexpected
- * behavior or denial of service to an applet.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
+ * behavior or denial of service to an applet.
* <tr>
- * <td>setWindowAlwaysOnTop</td>
- * <td>Setting always-on-top property of the window: {@link Window#setAlwaysOnTop}</td>
- * <td>The malicious window might make itself look and behave like a real full desktop, so that
- * information entered by the unsuspecting user is captured and subsequently misused </td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>showWindowWithoutWarningBanner</td>
- * <td>Display of a window without also displaying a banner warning
- * that the window was created by an applet</td>
- * <td>Without this warning,
- * an applet may pop up windows without the user knowing that they
- * belong to an applet. Since users may make security-sensitive
- * decisions based on whether or not the window belongs to an applet
- * (entering a username and password into a dialog box, for example),
- * disabling this warning banner may allow applets to trick the user
- * into entering such information.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>toolkitModality</td>
- * <td>Creating {@link Dialog.ModalityType#TOOLKIT_MODAL TOOLKIT_MODAL} dialogs
- * and setting the {@link Dialog.ModalExclusionType#TOOLKIT_EXCLUDE
- * TOOLKIT_EXCLUDE} window property.</td>
- * <td>When a toolkit-modal dialog is shown from an applet, it blocks all other
- * applets in the browser. When launching applications from Java Web Start,
- * its windows (such as the security dialog) may also be blocked by toolkit-modal
- * dialogs, shown from these applications.</td>
- * </tr>
- *
- * <tr>
- * <td>watchMousePointer</td>
- * <td>Getting the information about the mouse pointer position at any
- * time</td>
- * <td>Constantly watching the mouse pointer,
- * an applet can make guesses about what the user is doing, i.e. moving
- * the mouse to the lower left corner of the screen most likely means that
- * the user is about to launch an application. If a virtual keypad is used
- * so that keyboard is emulated using the mouse, an applet may guess what
- * is being typed.</td>
- * </tr>
+ * <th scope="row">setWindowAlwaysOnTop
+ * <td>Setting always-on-top property of the window:
+ * {@link Window#setAlwaysOnTop}
+ * <td>The malicious window might make itself look and behave like a real
+ * full desktop, so that information entered by the unsuspecting user is
+ * captured and subsequently misused
+ * <tr>
+ * <th scope="row">showWindowWithoutWarningBanner
+ * <td>Display of a window without also displaying a banner warning that the
+ * window was created by an applet
+ * <td>Without this warning, an applet may pop up windows without the user
+ * knowing that they belong to an applet. Since users may make
+ * security-sensitive decisions based on whether or not the window belongs
+ * to an applet (entering a username and password into a dialog box, for
+ * example), disabling this warning banner may allow applets to trick the
+ * user into entering such information.
+ * <tr>
+ * <th scope="row">toolkitModality
+ * <td>Creating {@link Dialog.ModalityType#TOOLKIT_MODAL TOOLKIT_MODAL}
+ * dialogs and setting the
+ * {@link Dialog.ModalExclusionType#TOOLKIT_EXCLUDE TOOLKIT_EXCLUDE} window
+ * property.
+ * <td>When a toolkit-modal dialog is shown from an applet, it blocks all
+ * other applets in the browser. When launching applications from Java Web
+ * Start, its windows (such as the security dialog) may also be blocked by
+ * toolkit-modal dialogs, shown from these applications.
+ * <tr>
+ * <th scope="row">watchMousePointer
+ * <td>Getting the information about the mouse pointer position at any time
+ * <td>Constantly watching the mouse pointer, an applet can make guesses
+ * about what the user is doing, i.e. moving the mouse to the lower left
+ * corner of the screen most likely means that the user is about to launch
+ * an application. If a virtual keypad is used so that keyboard is emulated
+ * using the mouse, an applet may guess what is being typed.
* </tbody>
* </table>
*
* @see java.security.BasicPermission
* @see java.security.Permission
* @see java.security.Permissions
* @see java.security.PermissionCollection
* @see java.lang.SecurityManager
*
- *
* @author Marianne Mueller
* @author Roland Schemers
*/
-
public final class AWTPermission extends BasicPermission {
/** use serialVersionUID from the Java 2 platform for interoperability */
private static final long serialVersionUID = 8890392402588814465L;
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