/* * Copyright (c) 2018, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. * DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER. * * This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it * under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as * published by the Free Software Foundation. Oracle designates this * particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided * by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code. * * This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License * version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that * accompanied this code). * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version * 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, * Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. * * Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA * or visit www.oracle.com if you need additional information or have any * questions. */ package sun.security.ssl; import java.io.IOException; import java.security.cert.X509Certificate; import sun.security.ssl.ClientHello.ClientHelloMessage; class ClientHandshakeContext extends HandshakeContext { /* * Allow unsafe server certificate change? * * Server certificate change during SSL/TLS renegotiation may be considered * unsafe, as described in the Triple Handshake attacks: * * https://secure-resumption.com/tlsauth.pdf * * Endpoint identification (See * SSLParameters.getEndpointIdentificationAlgorithm()) is a pretty nice * guarantee that the server certificate change in renegotiation is legal. * However, endpoing identification is only enabled for HTTPS and LDAP * over SSL/TLS by default. It is not enough to protect SSL/TLS * connections other than HTTPS and LDAP. * * The renegotiation indication extension (See RFC 5746) is a pretty * strong guarantee that the endpoints on both client and server sides * are identical on the same connection. However, the Triple Handshake * attacks can bypass this guarantee if there is a session-resumption * handshake between the initial full handshake and the renegotiation * full handshake. * * Server certificate change may be unsafe and should be restricted if * endpoint identification is not enabled and the previous handshake is * a session-resumption abbreviated initial handshake, unless the * identities represented by both certificates can be regraded as the * same (See isIdentityEquivalent()). * * Considering the compatibility impact and the actual requirements to * support server certificate change in practice, the system property, * jdk.tls.allowUnsafeServerCertChange, is used to define whether unsafe * server certificate change in renegotiation is allowed or not. The * default value of the system property is "false". To mitigate the * compactibility impact, applications may want to set the system * property to "true" at their own risk. * * If the value of the system property is "false", server certificate * change in renegotiation after a session-resumption abbreviated initial * handshake is restricted (See isIdentityEquivalent()). * * If the system property is set to "true" explicitly, the restriction on * server certificate change in renegotiation is disabled. */ static final boolean allowUnsafeServerCertChange = Utilities.getBooleanProperty( "jdk.tls.allowUnsafeServerCertChange", false); /* * the reserved server certificate chain in previous handshaking * * The server certificate chain is only reserved if the previous * handshake is a session-resumption abbreviated initial handshake. */ X509Certificate[] reservedServerCerts = null; X509Certificate[] deferredCerts; ClientHelloMessage initialClientHelloMsg = null; ClientHandshakeContext(SSLContextImpl sslContext, TransportContext conContext) throws IOException { super(sslContext, conContext); } @Override void kickstart() throws IOException { if (kickstartMessageDelivered) { return; } SSLHandshake.kickstart(this); kickstartMessageDelivered = true; } }